Grafton.
Project Barbara · Deal Memo

Glenn Flegg & Co (J300)

Acquisition target · v3 · 5 June 2026 — three investment cases, backed by the model

Independent lettings agency · Sourced: Adam J Walker (Julie Drake), 3 Jun 2026 · Status: Under review · Structure: asset / goodwill purchase (partnership) — but the broker now signals a share sale; being confirmed (§8).

1Recommendation

Progress to an exploratory meeting. Of the current opportunities, Glenn Flegg is the closest to an ideal first acquisition and a clean test of the AI-native thesis: lettings-dominant (~85%), recurring-heavy, consistently profitable, a clean family partnership selling for retirement, in the Thames Valley / Crossrail corridor. The headline looks cheap at ~5.9× net profit — but normalised for the partners' own (unpaid) time it is ~7.1× net profit, above our discipline; so this is “engage and negotiate”, not “snap up”. We underwrite on three cases (§7): the Downside (professionalise & sell) returns capital, the Base (enhance) is ~4.8× / ~1.7× money, and the Upside (transform) is free optionality (~3.8× / ~25% IRR). The two things to get right: the operator + Simone handover, and price discipline (the floor is thin).

2KPIs at a glance

All figures from the acquisition model; £, net of VAT. “Normalised” = after charging the partners' time at market and stripping owner / one-off costs (see §4).

Revenue — lettings (LTM Mar-25 / FY23)£560,636 / £501,099
Recurring fee income£440,759 (~79% of lettings revenue)
Lettings : sales mix~85% : 15%
Reported net profit (FY23 / LTM Mar-25)£171,684 / £161,329
Normalised net profit (today)£142,620 (~25% margin)
Run-rate EBITDA — Downside / Base / Upside£142.6k / £210.2k / £265.4k
Capital protected in the Downside?Yes — resale ~£1.06m ≥ ~£1.01m price (thin)
Asking price — ex-pipeline (guide)£1,010,093 (£1.10m)
Multiple — × reported net profit~5.9–6.3×
Multiple — × normalised net profit~7.1×
Multiple — × recurring fee income~2.3×
Multiple — × EBITDA (Down / Base / Up)7.1× / 4.8× / 3.8×
Revenue per employee (normalised)~£77k (vs ~£59k headcount; IB target £200k+)

3The opportunity

BusinessGlenn Flegg & Company · est. 1991 (34 yrs)
LocationLangley, Slough SL3 — Slough, Burnham, Cippenham, Colnbrook, Datchet, Iver, Langley, Maidenhead, Taplow, Windsor
StructurePartnership → asset / goodwill sale into a NewCo (TUPE + re-registration) — broker now signals a share sale; being confirmed (§8)
Guide£1.10m incl. £89,907 pipeline (cash-free / debt-free) → ~£1.01m ex-pipeline
Mix~85% lettings / ~15% sales · Software: Veco (Eurolink) · Seller motive: retirement

Book: 373 let — 289 fully managed, 66 rent-collect, 18 let-only. 349 active landlords (no landlord >10 properties). Avg rent £1,318 pcm. Fees 10% / 7% / 5%. No HMOs.

4Net profit — reported, normalised, and the bridge between them

This is the analysis the model now lets us do properly. The reported profit overstates the sustainable earnings, because a partnership strikes profit before paying the partners for their work. Normalising for that — and stripping owner-discretionary and one-off costs — is what a buyer actually underwrites.

PeriodTurnoverProfit (pre partners’ tax)Margin
FY to 31 Jul 2022£487,516£179,84737%
FY to 31 Jul 2023£501,099£171,68434%
8-mo stub to 31 Mar 2024*£343,183£106,056~31% (~£159k ann.)
LTM to Mar-2025 (seller BQ)£560,636£161,329 stated PBT~29%

*Year-end changed Jul→Mar in 2024.

The bridge — reported → normalised net profit (FY2023 basis):

Reported net profit (pre partners’ tax & drawings)171,684
Less: non-operating income (interest etc.)(5,569)
Add back: depreciation (non-cash)3,808
Add back: finance charges / HP (asset deal — vehicles not assumed)8,714
Add back: owner-discretionary & non-recurring**33,984
Less: partners’ / owner labour at market(70,000)
= Normalised net profit (today)142,620

**consultancy, management / inter-entity fees, entertaining, owner motor & travel, sundry partnership charges. †Glenn £12k (figurehead), Simone £55k (full-time operator — the real cost), Nick £3k (semi-detached).

The difference (£171,684 → £142,620 = −£29,064): the business looks ~£29k more profitable than it sustainably is. ~£70k of the reported profit is really the partners’ unpaid labour; that is only partly offset by the ~£47k of owner-discretionary / non-cash costs a buyer would strip and the £5.6k of non-operating income removed. So true maintainable earnings under arm’s-length ownership are ~£143k — the honest entry multiple is ~7.1×, not the ~5.9× the raw accounts imply. This ~£143k is the Downside (professionalised) earnings; the Base and Upside build on it (§7).

Revenue per employee (normalised). A productivity read we track across every opportunity.

Balance sheet is irrelevant to an asset buyer — the ~£671k “cash” is matched by ~£659k client / deposit / rent monies, not free cash. ⚠️ Still missing the FY-to-31-Mar-2025 statutory accounts; BQ profit also doesn’t tie exactly to stat profit (~£26k gap).

5Ownership & key-person analysis

Family partnership. The firm’s website now says owned by Glenn Flegg & Simone Georgeson; accounts to Mar-2024 still show three partners (Glenn 50% / Simone 25% / Nick 25%).

PartnerFamily roleReal involvementExit disruption
Glenn FleggFounder (1991), 50%Figurehead / brand; oldest landlord relationships. Not the day-to-day operator.Low operational / moderate relationship
Simone GeorgesonGlenn’s daughter, 25%Operational core — 16 years across every lettings role.High — the key person
Nick GeorgesonSon-in-law, 25% (b. Jan 1975)Semi-detached — director of Carr Williams (Ascot agency) + Nazcot Financial (mortgages).Low operational / competitive flag

Read: the genuine key-person risk is Simone. The thesis needs a permanent AI-native operator / GM (~£75k) to run and grow it — Simone hands over but won’t drive it — with the Head of PM (£36k, 2 yrs) the prime internal candidate to step up. Keep 1–2 book / process holders through the rebuild; covenant the exiting partners.

6Valuation vs thesis

CriterionTargetGlenn Flegg
Lettings-ledcore✅ ~85%
Managed properties80–300 (sweet 120–200)🟠 289 (373 let)
Mgmt-fee income£150–500k✅ ~£441k recurring
Entry multiple~1.7× recurring (≤2.5×)🟠 ~2.3× recurring / ~7.1× normalised net profit
Budget~£500k base / flexed to £2m🟠 ~£1.01m ex-pipeline
Structureshare preferred🟠 asset framing — but broker signals share sale (§8); share would help us on transition
Transparency✅ strong

7Three-case underwriting — Downside · Base · Upside

We underwrite on three cumulative tiers (see the Investment Strategy), each pulling a different lever. The rule: underwrite to the Base; require the Downside to return capital; treat the Upside as free optionality. Run-rate EBITDA from the model’s O6 Cases tab.

The basis for each case — and the work that gets us there:

CaseWhat it assumesRun-rate EBITDAEntry ×
Downside — ProfessionaliseNormalise earnings (replace the partners at market, strip owner-discretionary cost) and fix the business: compliance to 100%, clean accounts, contracts on standard terms, book proven transferable — the Tier-1 checklist. No automation.£142,6207.1×
Base — Enhance+ off-the-shelf tech (modern PMS, open-banking, portals), remove the family member, right-size headcount, professionalise management, optimise fees — the Tier-2 playbook. Captures ~half the full cost-and-margin opportunity.£210,1694.8×
Upside — Transform+ the Intelligent Letting Agency: the AI-native central brain, automation of the τ≈0 back office, operating leverage across the roll-up.£265,4363.8×

How the returns are built — 5-year hold: buy at ~£1.01m → collect EBITDA (after 25% tax) → sell at the case’s exit multiple (gross, indicative; from O6):

CaseExit basisExit value+ after-tax earnings (5 yr)Cash outMoney multiple
Downside2.4× recurring fee£1.06m£0.53m£1.09m~1.5×
Base5× EBITDA£1.05m£0.79m£1.09m~1.7×
Upside5× EBITDA£1.33m£1.00m£1.09m~2.1×

The floor holds — but it is thin. In the Downside, the cleaned, transferable book resells for ~£1.06m, above the ~£1.01m we’d pay — so capital is returned on the sale alone, before the earnings collected while we hold. We don’t lose. But the cushion is small (£1.06m vs £1.01m): it depends on buying at or below ~2.3–2.4× recurring fee — much above that and the Downside stops protecting capital. Price discipline is the whole game.

On IRR. The money multiples above are struck conservatively, on an all-cash-at-completion basis. With the actual 60–70% upfront / 30–40% deferred structure (deferred on landlord retention), the cash-timing IRR is materially higher — the Upside reaches ~25% on the full cash-flow model (O4 Returns), with the Base and Downside scaling below. All figures gross, before leverage and fees.

8Risks & DD gaps

  1. 🔴 Obtain FY-to-31-Mar-2025 accounts; reconcile to BQ profit (~£26k gap).
  2. 🔴 Deal structure — asset or share? The pack (BQ Q54 “Partnership — n/a”), the partnership accounts and the firm’s website all say unregistered partnership; the broker now says share sale. There is no Glenn Flegg company / LLP at Companies House — so a share sale implies a pre-sale incorporation. Confirm the entity, and that contracts / staff validly transfer into it. A share sale removes our novation / TUPE risk (good) but means inheriting liabilities → warranties + indemnities.
  3. 🟠 Premises — Langley lease expired; short-term being negotiated; confirm one office vs the marketed Burnham office.
  4. 🟠 Re-registration / TUPE if it lands as an asset deal (ICO, redress, CMP, deposit schemes, AML); falls away under a share sale.
  5. 🟠 Restrictive covenants from all exiting partners — Nick especially (Ascot agency + mortgage firm).
  6. 🟡 Confirm current partnership split; whether mortgage-referral income routes through Nick’s Nazcot.
  7. 🟡 Identify Head of PM by name; test willingness to step up. Secure Simone on a handover / consultancy term (use the 35%-deferred-on-retention lever).

9Next steps

10Qualifying preliminary DD requests

A short, focused set to send via AJW ahead of an exploratory meeting — they qualify the opportunity and signal a serious, prepared buyer.